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Exploring the performance of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises through the Credit 
Crunch 
By Paul Orton, Experian, 
Jake Ansell and  Galina Andreeva 
Business School, The University of Edinburgh 
Abstract 
Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) make a major contribution to most western 
economies.  They are often supported by government policies and in UK the government 
encourages banks to lend to them.  It is generally believed that the credit crunch will have had 
an impact on performance of SMEs.  This study looks at the impact of the crunch using large 
samples from 2007 through to 2010.  It looks at performance by Region, Age and Industrial 
sector (SIC code).  It then proceeds to explore the modelling of default over the years and 
especially focusing on young businesses.  It is found that there is a degree of stability within 
the models, though, the level of default varies across years. Young businesses, as has been 
found before, are shown to be more vulnerable. 
Keywords: credit scoring; small business; risk; banking, predictive modelling, credit crisis. 
  
 Introduction 
The centrality of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) to western economies is 
attested to by the willingness of governments and regulators to provide special conditions 
associated with lending to them.  Under Basel II and Basel III (BCBS, 2006, 2010) there have 
been special provision for SMEs.  UK Government has just introduced the National Loan 
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Guarantee Scheme in order to increase lending to SME, (HM Treasury, 2011).  They create 
innovation, provide jobs and contribute to Gross Domestic Product (Ma and Lin, 2010).  
Hence they are seen as an important part of the economy of most countries. They are, though, 
thought to be more vulnerable to the periods of economic downturn, (Howes, 2008).  The 
recent ‘credit crunch’ and the subsequent global financial crisis has had an impact on the 
viability of many SMEs (Wilson, 2009). 
There are several reasons for their vulnerability.  Some authors have stressed the impact of 
late payment and cash flow on the SMEs (Howes, 2008 ).  For some the vulnerability is 
related to Industrial sector the SME is associated with.  For example, many thought both 
construction and hospitality suffered particularly from the recent crisis (Ma, 2011). Changes 
in discretionary spending has had impacts that are specific to certain sectors, e.g. Retail, 
construction, tourism, hospitality, new cars, new kitchen… This is driven from a lack of 
consumer confidence meaning people are reluctant to borrow or spend on credit cards.  
  Lack of credit is often quoted as a concern, but there is some evidence that SMEs have not 
taken up the credit that is available. A survey by SME Finance Monitor in UK found that in a 
sample of 5000 SME only 15% had applied for new credit. (ref?)  There may be a range of 
reasons for this; SMEs unwilling to take on more lending.  Many SMEs have a conservative 
strategy during a recessionary period desiring to reduce debt rather than take on more. 
Reduction in business confidence makes businesses more reluctant to invest and hence lower 
propensities to borrow. Other SMEs will not be in a position to take on credit since they do 
not have further collateral to support borrowing. Some business will have already borrowed 
up to their credit limit.  
Banks have throughout the period been willing to lend to SMEs and have been encouraged to 
do so by governments. A market research by BDRC Continental in UK found 75% of SME 
had over drafts approved whilst 59% were successful in applying for loans (ref?). Project 
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Merlin was an agreement between banks and the government which set targets for bank 
lending to businesses as well as a target for SME lending.  It is, however, the case that 
governments have already required banks to lend prudently.  The increase in capital 
requirements under Basel III (BCBS, 2010) and Vickers Report (Independent Commission on 
Banking, 2011) has had and will have an impact on abilities of banks to lend.  The 
availability to banks of money, until the recent initiative by the UK government (HM 
Treasury, 2011), though, the impact may only reduce the commercial lending rate by 1%. . 
Given the need for prudent lending, in light of Basel Accords, there has to be a focus on 
modelling the probability of default (PD) and hence its impact on credit lending. Whilst Basel 
doesn’t necessarily dictate prudent lending, greater unknowns around levels of conservatism 
required to ensure PD models are measuring a long run average PD will increase capital 
requirements.  That is, a better understanding of how PD models work through the economic 
cycle could reduce the capital required to provide against bad debts and free more capital up 
for lending. 
 Obviously it becomes of interest to consider whether there has been a change in the models 
predicting default over the period of the crisis.  Hence in this study the aim is to consider 
changes in terms of variables comprising the models and in terms of predictive accuracy of 
the models during this period of downturn.  The current research is based on a large 
anonymised database supplied by Experian covering the 4 years: 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.  
The results reported are initial findings of exploratory analysis being carried out within the 
Centre for Credit Research at Edinburgh. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The data and preliminary data will be discussed in 
the next section. This will be followed by a description of the methodology.  The results will 
be subsequently provided.  The final section will be conclusion and description of further 
work. 
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Data and Preliminary Analysis 
The dataset is described in Table 1. For each record there are 92 variables covering summary 
data, director data, payment and public record including searches, derogatory data, financial 
data, trend data, Experian data (CAIS and Delphi) and performance data.  Two measures are 
used for performance, one indicating impairment but not necessarily default, and a measure 
closer to actual default. One of the key differences between the two measures is that the 
Definition 2 under-measures the default rates for businesses under £150k of total assets. Thus 
for assessment of the SME performance Definition 1 or closure is more helpful  and is used 
in  this study (see Table 1). 
 As shown in Table 1, 2009 is seen as the worst year for performance for both definitions.  
The change for Definition 1 is greater than Definition 2, and this is to be expected since 
impairment is more likely to be affected than actual default.  Figure 1 provides regional 
variation in performance by Definition 1.  The differences between regions may be due to 
date onset of downturn in a region or may be related to Industrial sectors present in a region.  
Figure 2 indicates changes over Industrial sectors.  It is clear that the Services have suffered 
most during the initial stages of the ‘credit crunch’ with considerably higher rate in 2009 for 
Service sectors. 
There is considerable evidence that ‘young’ SMEs are more vulnerable than older SMEs 
(Beresford and Saunders, 2005; Altman et al., 2009) and hence it is worth investigating 
differences.  There are, though, issues surrounding very early casualties.  Some SMEs are 
designed as a special financial vehicle for a single time limited event or may be a SME 
created but never active as a business. Additionally, many of the companies that are dissolved 
without ever filing accounts have never actually traded.  These are difficult to pick out from 
the more genuine failures. To avoid this problem we have decided to divide the age scale into 
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3 sections: less than or equal to 36 months, greater than 36 months but less than or equal to 
60 months and those greater than 60 months.  Figure 3 highlights the observation about better 
performance by older SMEs.   It can be argued that the very young and young businesses 
show closer performance in a downturn (especially in 2009) as compared to older companies.  
Hence it was felt appropriate to base the subsequent model-building on all the data, less than 
or equal to 60 months (Start-Ups) and greater than 60 months (Non-Start-Ups). 
 
Methodology 
The  first step in considering  the impact of ‘credit crunch’ on SMEs during period 2007 to 
2010 is to look at whether there have been changes in associations between SMEs perfomace 
and their other characteristics that can be used to predict the performance/default. A random 
training sample of 10% was drawn from each of the 4 separate years,  as a snap-shot of SMEs  
that existed in April of the corresponding year.  The performance was assessed the following 
April.  Twelve months is the usual observation time considered in credit scoring for the 
purpose of default modelling (Thomas et al., 2002). The firms conforming to Definition 1 
within 12-month period have been classed as ‘Bad’ for this period, the remaining ones have 
been considered ‘Good’. A list of some of the variables that have been included in the 
analysis is given in Appendix A, for commercial confidentiality unfortunately the whole set 
of variables cannot be released. 
 Training samples have been used to develop a number of models predicting probability of 
default, pi, where i=2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.  Logistic Regression was used to model the 
relationship between probability of default and set of potential predictor variables, Xj, where 
j=1,2 … J, in the form: 
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 Ln{ pi /(1- pi)} = i +  jiXji      (1) 
where i = 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and j=1,2 … J. 
Following Lin et al., 2011 the predictor variables were coarse classified and transformed 
using the weights of evidence:  
WoE = ln (giB / biG)       (2) 
where bi (gi) are respective number of Bads (Goods) within category i  
B (G) are total numbers of Bads (Goods) in the sample. 
 The use of weights of evidence is common within credit scoring and Lin et al., 2011 
demonstrated the benefits in using the approach for modelling SMEs. 
 
A common problem in credit risk modelling is intercorrelation between predictor variables. 
In order to gain insights into the interdependence structure of predictors used in this analysis 
an Oblique PCA has been performed. This method is an extension of traditional Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) that consists in rotating the orthogonal principal components and 
at the same time relaxing the condition of their independence. The procedure results in 
groups (clusters) of variables that ere linear combinations of the first principal component of 
a particular cluster. In predictive modelling this enhances interpretability of the solution, 
since each variable is assigned to one group, and judgements can be made on the variables 
that are mostly correlated with each other. More on Oblique PCA is gven in Harris and 
Kaiser (1964).A stepwise approach was employed using SPSS software, inclusion or removal 
based on 5% level of significance for variable under consideration, to obtain the linear 
combination.  Clearly given the size of the data  many variables might have been selected.  
To ensure a parsimonious model it was decided to consider the change in Cox and Snell or 
 7 
Nagelkerke Psuedo R
2
 Statistic (Cox and Snell, 1989; Nagelkerke, 1991).  Variable selection 
was then terminated when the change in the Psuedo R
2
 Statistic fell below 1% for the first 
time.  Obviously it was possible that this would potentially terminate selection too early in 
the process.  To avoid this problem the Psuedo R
2
 Statistic for allowing the stepwise model to 
go to completion so no new variables where selected or removed with criterion above was 
also considered.  In no cases was there found a large rise in the Statistic beyond the 
termination point. The Psuedo R
2
 Statistics are reported in subsequent section.  
Logistic Regression models were fitted to the to the training samples  for each year, for all the 
companies,  and separately for the Start-Ups  (SU) and for  Non-Start-Ups (Non SU).  (Start-
Ups were companies up to and including 60 months, and Non-Start-Ups were the remaining 
businesses.)  This allowed comparison of the 3  models for each year and comparison across 
years. One aspect of comparison are variables that enter in each model, and therefore, are 
significant predictors of default. The assessment of model fit can be judged by Pseudo R
2
. In 
credit scoring it is also important to consider the predictive accuracy of the models, which is 
measured  via Area Under the ROC Curve (AUROC) (Thomas et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2011).   
One more aspect of interest would be to examine the stability of the prediction over time.  To 
explore this aspect it was decided to explore whether the models constructed for 2007 could 
provide reasonable prediction for subsequent years.  Hence the model for 2007 was used to 
predict the outcome for the other years using the full datasets with over 2 million data points. 
Changes in predictive accuracy were compared using  AUROC again as the assessment 
measure. 
 
Results 
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In the preliminary analysis the impact of Region, Industrial sector and Age was seen on a 
univariate base.   Appendix A lists the 26 variables that have been selected across the years 
and the data subsets for inclusion in the Logistic Default Model.  It is notable that only 4 
variables appear across all the models.  These are Legal Form, Time since last derogatory 
data items (months), Lateness of Accounts and Time Since Last Annual Return.  There is, 
however, more commonality within years and subsets of data (All data, Start-Ups and Non-
StarUps). 
For 2007 the commonality of variables consists additionally of Industrial sector, Total Value 
of Judgements in Last 12 Months and Total Assets. 2008 has additionally Total Value of 
Judgements in Last 12 Months.  The models for 2009 have considerably more variables 
appearing with variables Number of Appointments in the last 12 Months as a percentage of 
the current board, Number of Directors Holding Shares, Total Assets and Full CAIS Delphi 
score. 2010 is more akin to 2007 with variable Total Value of Judgements in Last 12 Months 
added.  Part of the explanation of this arises from the number of Bads being seen in each 
year. 2009 with more Bads has the largest number of common variables.  When considering 
the subsets of data All data set has several additional variables in common with Number of 
Appointments in the last 12 Months as a percentage of the current board, Number of 
Directors Holding Shares, Total Value of Judgements in Last 12 Months, Total Assets, but 
both Start-Ups and Non-Start-Ups have limited number of extra common variables with 
Number of Appointments in the last 12 Months as a percentage of the current board and Full 
CAIS Delphi score for Start-Ups and Total Fixed Assets as a percentage of Total Assets for 
Non-Start-Ups. 
Obviously this prompts the need to consider whether other commonalities are present in 
terms of associated variables.  To study this Oblique Principal Component Analysis was 
employed  using all 90 predictor variables, which   was carried out for each of the years 
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separately.  Table 6 presents a summary of the clusters of the variables that are found.  In 
terms of the variables used within the model Table 7 presents the oblique PCA cluster 
membership.  The results for 2007 and 2008 are the same whilst they are different in 2009 
and 2010. For the variables that are common across all models only Lateness of Accounts 
remains within same cluster throughout.  If one assumes that members of the same clusters 
are commutable then the only distinct variables in the models that only appear occasionally, 
are Region, Number of appointments in the last 12 months as a percentage of the current 
board, Worst status in last 3 months on accounts opened 12 months ago and Full CAIS 
Delphi score.  It is notable that Region appears in the early models whilst Worst status in last 
3 months on accounts opened 12 months ago and Full CAIS Delphi score later models.  An 
argument could be advanced that Region was significant in early models because of a 
differential initial effect of the credit crunch.  The other two variables become more 
significant as the impact of credit crunch becomes more significant. 
Model fit statistics (Cox and Snell, Nagelkerke Pseudo-R
2
) are given in Table 3. It is notable 
that both measures improve from 2007 to 2009 on all subsets. After peaking in 2009, they 
come down in 2010. This is in line with the changes in the proportion of defaults, the model 
fit becomes better as the number of defaults grows, and vice versa. In a downturn, bad 
companies fail.  In other trading circumstances, bad companies may limp on and survive. 
This supports a common wisdom that downtowns are beneficial for modelling – there is a 
silver lining in every cloud. 
Yet it has been mentioned before that the focus of credit scoring is on predictive accuracy, 
and these results are reported in Table 4. AUROC shows the same tendency as with measures 
of model fit – predictive accuracy improves during the crisis. It should be mentioned that 
Table 4 presents in-sample measures, i.e. AUROC are calculated on the corresponding 
training samples. This normally leads to slightly optimistic results. Nevertheless, in the 
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context of this study it is believed to be an acceptable limitation, since the focus is on 
comparison across the years and subsets and such comparison is not distorted by looking at 
in-sample results.  
Table 5 demonstrates what would happen if one would continue using 2007 models through 
the crisis without re-developing them. A general dynamics is similar to results discussed 
above, and so it is possible to conclude that the models perform well in the downturn in terms 
of predictive accuracy. The column ‘In Sample’ is repeated form Table 4 and gives the 
benchmark of the performance of the most up-to-date model or the situation when the models 
are re-developed every year. The majority of subsets show the advantage of ‘In Sample’ 
models, which is to be expected. Yet this advantage is marginal, with maximum difference 
being 0.019. Therefore, one can conclude that predictive power of scoring models is y 
resilient.  
There are several subsets (2007 SU, 2009 Non-SU, 2010 Non-SU) that show better 
performance of 2007 models. This is counter-intuitive, but can be explained by varying 
number of predictors selected into each model.  
 
 Conclusion and Further Work 
It is obvious that the ‘Credit Crunch’ has had an impact on SME performance.  2009 exhibits 
the worst performance during this initial period of the ‘credit crunch’.  Of the enterprises 
those which are younger are more affected than older companies as are companies in the 
service sector more affected than others.  There does not immediately seem to be a regional 
impact. 
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The initial interpretation of analysis may suggest that the models for the years are very 
different with only 4 variables appearing throughout all models: Legal Form, Time since last 
derogatory data items (months), Lateness of Accounts and Time Since Last Annual Return.  
Also regional and industrial sectors indicators do not appear across all models.  It is, though, 
clear that there is stability across the years based on the evidence of the capability of the 2007 
models to predict well performance in the other years.  One possibility is that the difference 
in models is due to interdependence between the variables considered. 
Given the stability found within the models it may be of interest to develop a resilient generic 
model across the four years.  This would be based on the results found from the Oblique PCA 
analysis. 
This paper represents the initial analysis of a longer study.  Certain aspects that have proved 
significant in the current work need to be further researched.  The issue of dependency within 
in the data set has not been fully explored.  There is some evidence as shown in Figure X that 
region do respond on slightly different time scales.  It may also be that regions employed 
could be refined.  Whilst only a slight impact is seen in terms of Industrial sector there is 
evidence that especially in 2009 service related sector performs worst to the downturn.  The 
classification of Industrial sector also needs refinement which is plausible given the data set.  
There may also be questions whether further structural modelling will provide insight to 
dependencies within the data. 
As indicated age of the SME was found to be a significant aspect within the preliminary 
analysis.  This aspects needs further to be explored within the data.  It may be that certain 
businesses which are young are less vulnerable than others.  This may aid business lending to 
newly established SMEs and help policy makers devise future strategy. 
 12 
Finally the snapshots have been treated as separate data sets.  Since there are available unique 
identifiers within the datasets it will be possible to track the behaviour over time.  A subset of 
the data can be treated as panel data and hence be more fully investigated for time effects.  
With only 4 points of time currently we do not perceive, however, that it is possible to 
include macro-economic factors into the analysis. 
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Table 1: Dataset description and performance measure  by Definition 1 and 2. 
 Number of 
SMEs 
Definition 1 
(%) 
Definition 2 
(%) 
2007 2,117,278  6.9 0.75 
2008 2,227,610 11.81 0.97 
2009 2,204,474 16.06 .0.95 
2010 2,159,156 11.87 0.87 
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Figure 1: Poor Performance by Region. 
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Figure 2: Industrial sectors displaying 1 digit level of SIC code  
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Figure 3: Poor Performance by Age in Months 
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Table 2: Variables included in the models (Variable list is given in Appendix A) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
  A                                                     
2007 S                                                     
  N                                                     
                                                        
  A                                                     
2008 S                                                     
  N                                                     
                                                        
  A                                     
2009 S                                      
  N                                      
                                                        
  A                                       
2010 S                  x                     
  N                                       
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Table 3: Pseudo R2 Statistics: Cox and Snell (CS), and Nagelkerke (N) for the models used 
in Table 2 
   CS N 
2
0
0
7 
All 0.120 0.300 
Start-Up 0.149 0.324 
Non SU 0.052 0.196 
2
0
0
8 
All 0.207 0.390 
Start-Up 0.235 0.390 
Non SU 0.126 0.336 
2
0
0
9 
All 0.308 0.517 
Start-Up 0.329 0.500 
Non SU 0.205 0.427 
2
1 
0 
All 0.211 0.401 
Start-Up 0.238 0.393 
Non SU 0.148 0.372 
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Table 4: Area Under the Curve (AUROC) with 95% Confidence Interval for AUROC (CI) 
   AUROC CI 
2
0
0
7 
All 0.820 0.816 0.824 
Start-Up 0.817 0.813 0.822 
Non SU 0.795 0.786 0.804 
2
0
0
8 
All 0.852 0.849 0.854 
Start-Up 0.840 0.837 0.844 
Non SU 0.843 0.837 0.850 
2
0
0
9 
All 0.886 0.884 0.888 
Start-Up 0.868 0.865 0.870 
Non SU 0.870 0.865 0.874 
2
0
1
0 
All 0.851 0.849 0.854 
Start-Up 0.830 0.826 0.833 
Non SU 0.850 0.845 0.856 
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Table 5: Comparison of AUROC in Sample and Applying 2007 model across all years on full 
dataset 
   In Sample 2007 Difference 
  
2007 
  
All 0.820 0.820 0.000 
Start-Up 0.817 0.820 -0.003 
Non SU 0.795 0.793 0.002 
  
2008 
  
All 0.852 0.841 0.011 
Start-Up 0.840 0.826 0.014 
Non SU 0.843 0.837 0.006 
  
2009 
  
All 0.886 0.876 0.010 
Start-Up 0.868 0.853 0.015 
Non SU 0.870 0.889 -0.019 
  
2010 
  
All 0.851 0.840 0.011 
Start-Up 0.830 0.811 0.019 
Non SU 0.850 0.851 -0.001 
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Table 6: Summary Table of Oblique PCA Results across the 4 Years 
Year Number of 
Cluster 
Proportion of 
Variation 
Explained 
Max Cluster 
size 
Min Cluster 
size 
2007 18 0.7895 24 1 
2008 18 0.7852 24 1 
2009 18 0.7712 14 1 
2010 18 0.7891 10 2 
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Table 7: Oblique PCA Cluster membership of variables used in models  
Variable 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 B B B N 
2 A A A A 
3 C C C N 
4 B B B B 
5 D D D D 
6 E E E E 
7 B B B B 
8 F F F F 
9 G G G G 
10 H H H H 
11 H H H H 
12 I I I I 
13 I I L I 
14 B B B B 
15 A A A A 
16 A A L A 
17 A A M M 
18 A A M M 
19 A A M M 
20 A A A A 
21 A A A A 
22 A A A A 
23 E E E E 
24 E E E E 
25 J J J J 
26 K K K K 
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Appendix A 
 
Table of Variable Included in Models 
 
Number Variable Name 
1 Legal Form 
2 1992 SIC Code 
3 Region 
4 No of Current Directors 
5 
Number of Appointments in the last 12 Months as a percentage of the 
current board 
6 Oldest Age of Current Directors/Proprietors supplied (Years) 
7 Number of Directors Holding Shares 
8 PP Worst DBT in the last 12 Months 
9 Total Value of Judgements in Last 12 Months 
10 Number of Previous Searches (last 6m) 
11 Number of Previous Searches (last 12m) 
12 Last derogatory item 
13 Time since last degrogatory item (months) 
14 Lateness of Accounts 
15 Consolidated Accounts 
16 Time Since Last Annual Return 
17 Capital Employed 
18 Retained Earnings 
19 Total Assets 
20 Issues Capital (Financial) 
21 Current Liabilities  
22 Total Fixed Assets as a percentage of Total Assets 
23 Percentage Change in Shareholders Funds 
24 Percentage Change in Total Assets 
25 Worst status in last 3 months on accounts opened 12 months ago 
26 Full CAIS Delphi score 
 
 
